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Welcome
to my collection of Pantheist Essays
– This essay is from a University of Queensland assignment I wrote in 2002. As such it has a somewhat 'heavy philosophy' style. It explores Spinozas ideas regarding 'Good and Evil' in his 'Ethics' and compares his ideas to those of Immanuel Kant. The essay on Kant's 'Good Will' follows at the end - although it originally preceded the Spinoza section !! Some time soon I intend to rewrite this with a more practical focus & readable style. --------------------------------------------------- The Nature of Good and Evil in Pantheist Ethics : Spinoza claims there is no Good or Evil in Nature !! ... Spinoza’s claim that there is neither good nor evil in the world, initially raises many questions. However, properly qualified and understood in the context in which Spinoza intended, it makes considerable sense, and in many ways is comparable with modern theories of moral psychology. The qualification necessary is that Spinoza was referring to the natural world outside of human valuation, and simultaneously claiming that ideas of good and evil result from human valuation. This much is clear from such statements as: ‘Desire
is appetite with consciousness thereof. It is thus plain from
what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long
for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the
other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish
for it, long for it, or desire it.’ (Ethics III P9 S).
Lloyd (1996 101) further explains Spinoza’s position: ‘There is no independently existing good which the rational mind strives to perceive’, ie. the good or bad valuations that we perceive are simply a direct result of how things impinge on us. Our ‘distorted self-centred perceptions’ of good and evil project onto the world values that do not exist in nature—they are just human or personal values. Spinoza’s basis for this claim lies both in his conception of Nature-God, and in his emphasis on the concept of conatus—the striving of each organism for continued existence—which eventually results in his ‘unselfish’ version of ethical egoism. Spinoza’s monist-pantheist conception of God, is as a single, infinite and perfect substance or being, co-extensive with everything that exists (ie. equivalent to nature or the universe). For Spinoza, our spiritual conception of God, is God understood via the attribute of thought, while the physical world (Nature) is God understood via the attribute of extension. The particular idea that Nature-God is perfect would seem to leave no room for the possibility of good or evil in nature, but the idea of conatus explains where our notions of good and evil come from. Briefly, Spinoza equates conatus with the actual essence of the thing—the thing just is its striving to exist as a particular manifestation or mode of the one Nature-God. If this striving is conscious it is called the will (I will discuss the will shortly) and it is precisely because humans can consciously strive to persist, that we have a conscious understanding of what promotes our persistence (good) and what diminishes it (evil).1 (FOOTNOTE: 1 Or is it the other way around? Is it plausible that the necessity to comprehend what is good and bad for us, was a cornerstone in the development of human cognitive abilities—but this for another essay!) But according to Spinoza, (apparently regardless of our conscious understanding, but possibly aided by it), humans are ‘determined to do the things that promote their own preservation’ (Lloyd 74). Our appetites are a result of conatus and aimed at survival, and as such they determine our perceptions of good and evil. For Spinoza this is as it should be, and in accordance with his ‘rationally perfect’ conception of Nature-God: ‘As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him ... should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being.’ (Ethics IV P18 S) As we will see below, according to Kant this ‘natural’ inclination towards happiness apparently has no moral worth, but for Spinoza it is the basis of morality—creating our perceptions of good and evil (via the desire to ‘persist’). At this point, Spinoza’s theory begins to look like ‘selfish’ ethical egoism, which would have every creature interested only in its own survival, at any price to others, but Spinoza removes this selfish aspect, while retaining the fundamental good of self-preservation, by relating the good of one person to the good of all so that: ‘(Hence)
men who are governed by reason—that is, who seek what is useful
to them in accordance with reason—desire for themselves nothing,
which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and,
consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
conduct.’ (Ethics IV P18 S).
An interesting and disturbing result of Spinoza’s deterministic approach is his denial of free will. In fact Spinoza denies that even God can act from free will, because it would be inconsistent both with God’s freedom and perfection. As explained by Lloyd, God’s freedom ‘is the freedom of a ‘free cause’ acting from the necessity of a nature which includes neither will nor intellect.’ (Llyod 45). That Nature-God is perfect also implies that there can be nothing for God to will, as this would admit imperfection and assume that God lacks something which it desires (Lloyd 46-47). Similarly, according to Spinoza, humans also lack free will, and our erroneous belief in it stems from the fact that although we are conscious of our volitions and appetites, we are unable through ignorance to understand the causal nature of them (Lloyd 46). Still, I think there may be some room for an amount of free will: While all creatures are determined to pursue their satisfaction or happiness, for a rational being such as humans, there remains I think some latitude for decisions based on free will to determine how we go about achieving this. Though we probably have significantly less free will than we might like to suppose, Kant’s demonstration that free will is necessary for morality remains for me a compelling argument for the existence of an element of free will in human striving. Given that Spinoza believes our conatus determines us to do the things that promote our preservation, it would seem that possibilities of personal freedom would also be limited, but Spinoza has a different kind of freedom in mind—the freedom to accept and act according to one’s conatus. This freedom is gained via a sound understanding of the functioning of the affects and their determined nature. An important aspect is the knowledge that nothing that befalls us is truly good or evil in its own right. Spinoza believes that when the affects are properly understood to be temporary, determined, necessary, and morally neutral, this leads to greater powers of moderation of the passions by the mind, and also the development of ethical maxims as a guide to the best way of living (Garrett 1996 279-282). These understandings based on reason also give us the freedom—perhaps from emotional entanglement—to pursue our conatus more effectively. Here again I think we have some latitude for a certain degree of free will—that is, the reasoned will to react to our passions in a more reasonable and perhaps detached way, to allow more effective functioning. “the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on his way rejoicing.” (Ethics IV P73 S). Although I have only touched the surface of the ethical theories of both Kant and Spinoza, I believe Spinoza’s are more broad-based, fluid and eloquent—as demonstrated by the passage above—than those of Kant, whose prime emphasis on duty seems to lack the depth necessary for a widely acceptable and practical ethical theory. An Assessment of Kant’s Account of
Good Will & Moral Motivation Immanuel Kant’s account of moral motivation is based on his concept of the ‘good will’ which is motivated by a moral sense of duty emanating from within. Although good will and duty are no doubt important factors in human morality, I feel that Kant overemphasises these—particularly the role of duty, when notions of a good will seem to better suit the concepts of virtue ethics. According to Kant, a good will is the only conceivable thing which can be ‘called good without qualification’ (ie. intrinsically good) and possession of a good will ‘constitutes the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness’ (G I para1). A basis for this is Kant’s solid belief in human free will. This he believes, is demonstrated by the mere existence of moral concepts such as good, ought, right etc. For these moral convictions to have any meaning (which they do), necessarily implies that we have some degree of choice in our actions—for if we have no choice or free will, these moral concepts can make no sense. We cannot sensibly judge an act to be right or wrong, if the act was pre-determined and the agent had no choice (Magee 1998 136-137). Kant also believed that only rational creatures (ie. humans) could have a sense of morality, for only they could comprehend reasons for and against an action. (G II para 13). Through an argument which appeals to the adaptive qualities of nature in assigning instincts to a creature for the purpose of its happiness (satisfaction), Kant decides that the faculty of reason—which is necessary for morality and often works against the instincts to stifle passions and desires, resulting in dissatisfaction—developed for a nobler and more important end than happiness. Kant says the supreme good at which the reason is aimed is the good will. (G I para 5-7) Kant then sets out to develop his conception of the good will via the notion of duty, rather than taking a virtue-based approach, as one might expect at this point. Explaining the moral value of duty-based actions, Kant gives three main propositions: 1. in order to have moral worth, an action must be done out of duty 2. an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined (ie. the consequences of the action are irrelevant) 3. duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. (G I para 9-15) The first highlights one of the problematic aspects of Kant’s theory—his apparent insistence that for an act to have any moral worth it must be done out of duty alone, rather than from any other inclination such as selfish or altruistic desire or even love. For example Kant states that ‘to be beneficent when we can is a duty’, but if one finds ‘pleasure in spreading joy’ or ‘delights in the satisfaction of others’, then the action has ‘no true moral worth’ (G I para 11). The implication here seems to be that only acts which we somehow find objectionable or at least gain no pleasure from, can have any moral worth. Conceding a little, I think we can discern some difference between actions done solely from duty, and those to which we are otherwise inclined (with or without a duty component). It may be much more difficult to ‘drag ourselves’ towards beneficence or personal happiness out of a sense of duty alone, but does this necessarily mean that the same acts performed out of inclination have no moral worth?—I think not. Some have even expressed the view—addressed below—that acting out of inclination is more acceptable, and that acting from duty alone might be morally repugnant. Next, Kant goes on to announce that although we have a duty to ‘secure one’s own happiness’, achieving one’s happiness also has no moral value if we are inclined towards it in any way other than a sense of duty (G I para 12). Here, I would express the view that any person of sound mind is naturally inclined towards their own happiness (satisfaction or fulfilment), but if so, then according to Kant, happiness has no moral worth, except for those decrepit souls who look for it only out of duty. This notion seems to me to border on the ridiculous. I would instead say that within certain boundaries—such as: that one’s happiness does not impinge another’s rights—seeking one’s own happiness is indeed a moral ‘ought’, by both inclination, and duty. Baron (1995 147-150), claims that Kant’s statement that ‘it is much harder to make this distinction (between duty or inclination) when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it,’(G I para 9) indicates that he does not believe that actions with a component of inclination have no moral worth. I remain unconvinced however, by this and the rest of Baron’s arguments, given that later in the same paragraph Kant concludes: ‘the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view’. In addition, every example Kant subsequently offers in section I seems to state clearly that any inclination at all, negates moral worth. The second and third propositions also raise their own problems, which I can mention only briefly. Regarding the second—surely the consequences of an action must count for something. A mountain of good intentions is worth little or nothing (including morally) if the consequences are disastrous. Example: I perform an act out of duty and with good intentions, but the act backfires causing a catastrophe and costing human lives. Possibly I could be excused the first time around—the act might be considered at best morally neutral (probably also negligent and stupid). Now, a year later—having learnt nothing—I do exactly the same thing, with the same consequences—surely the act must now be judged to be immoral (unless I, as the agent am severely defective). The third principle, again raises the question of whether acting purely out of duty to uphold the moral law (even though we may do so reluctantly) and without any other inclination to act in this way, might be morally offensive. Put another way: in many situations (such as a friend helping us in some way) we would prefer that someone act out of natural inclination—say friendly love—rather than out of duty. Duty appears to be second best in these circumstances. To this effect Baron quotes P.H. Nowell–Smith: ‘the sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty’ (Baron 125). This mention of the ‘really good man’ harks to a different, and I think preferable approach to moral reasoning—that of virtue ethics and the question of what it is to be a ‘good person’—and surely a good person would be in possession of a good will, and have minimal need for the concept of duty. There is no doubt that a sense of duty is useful in moral thinking, particularly at an early stage of moral development, but I feel that the inconsistencies examined above demonstrate that the concept of duty alone is not a sufficient basis for a moral theory. Original Sources Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. (Trans. T.K. Abbott). In Library of the Future (3rd ed.). Irvine Cal.: World Library Inc., 1991-94. (abbreviated - G) Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch). (1677). “Ethics: Demonstrated in Geometrical Order”. Spinoza's Ethics / Elwes Translation 1997. <http://www.mtsu.edu/rbombard/RB/Spinoza/ ethica-front.html> (10 June 2002). (abbreviated – Ethics) Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch). Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being. (E. Curly trans). London: Penguin Books, 1996. (abbreviated – ST) Bibliography Baron, Marcia W. Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Ithaca and London: Cornell Uni Press, 1995. Garrett, Don. The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. New York: Cambridge Uni. Press, 1996. Lloyd, Genevieve. Spinoza and the Ethics. London and New York: Routledge, 1996. Magee, Bryan. The Story of Philosophy. London: Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 1998. |